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ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE SPENDING




In recent years the movement embracing environmental justice
has received significant attention and gained tremendous momen-
tum, not only among civil and environmental rights advocates, but
also among the general public.' The term "environmental justice" is
used in reference to the discriminatory impact or adverse effect that
local environmental laws, regulations, or decisions have on minority
and low-income populations.2 Advocates of environmental justice em-
brace action to provide enhanced protection against state programs
and policies that have intentional or disparate effects on the health
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2003; B.A., University of
Notre Dame, 1996. I would like to thank my family, especially my most amazing wife
Melissa for all of her love, support, and encouragement. I would also like to thank
Professor A.J. Bellia of the Notre Dame Law School for taking the time to provide
insightful and helpful comments on an earlier draft, Mr. John M. Kyle, III of
Indianapolis for introducing me to the topic, and the members of the Notre Dame Law
Review for all of their hard work on this Note.
1 See Lisa A. Binder, Religion, Race, and Rights: A Rhetorical Overview of Environmen-
tal Justice Disputes, 6 Wis. ENvri. LJ. 1, 8 (1999); Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism
Claims Brought Under Title VY of the Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285, 286 (1995).
2 Director Christine Todd Whitman of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) recently provided the following definition of "environmental justice": "The
Agency defines environmental justice to mean the fair treatment of people of all
races, cultures, and incomes with respect to the developnient, implementation, and
enforcement of environmental laws and policies, and their meaningful involvement
in the decisionmaking processes of the government." Memorandum from Christine
Todd Whitman, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, on the EPA's Com-
mitment to Environmental Justice (Aug. 9, 2001), available at http://Nv.epa.gov/
swerosps/ej/html-doc/ejmemo.htm (on file with author).
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
and environment of people based on their race, color, national origin,
or income. The concept of environmental justice and its advocates
are important for this Note because traditional civil rights activists
have started to channel energy toward the movement, and civil rights
plaintiffs have recently forced a fundamental civil rights question to
the forefront-whether federal regulations, specifically disparate im-
pact regulations issued pursuant to section 602 of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,3 provide enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, the statute designed to provide a vehicle to remedy violations
of constitutional and some federal statutory rights.
4
Despite its growing appeal among civil rights activists, the envi-
ronmental justice movement has achieved little success in the courts.5
Recently, however, a group of citizens from South Camden, New
Jersey (South Camden Citizens in Action) scored a small victory by
obtaining a temporary injunction in federal district court against the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. 6 The injunc-
tion prevented the issuing of air pollution permits for a new factory in
an already "environmentally burdened" and heavily minority-popu-
lated geographic area.7 The briefly successful claim 8 alleged viola-
3 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994)). The
statute provides in part that "[n] o person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance." Id.
4 Section 1983 provides,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
5 See Lorraine Woellert, Dumping on the Poor?, Bus. Wt., Nov. 19, 2001, at 120,
121 (noting the fifteen-year lack of success of the environmental justice movement in
the courts).
6 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 505,
549 (D.N.J. 2001) (SCCIA II), rev'd, S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of
Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 70 U.S.L.W. 3669 (U.S. June 24,
2002) (No. 01-1547).
7 Id.
8 The Third Circuit recently lifted the injunction. S. Camden Citizens in Action
v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 777 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 70 U.S.L.W.
3669 (U.S. June 24, 2002) (No. 01-1547).
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tions of disparate impact regulations issued pursuant to section 602 of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.9
Proponents of environmental justice are well pleased with the
South Camden residents' initial success and have been touting their
new legal strategy as "a road map for environmental justice advo-
cates."' 0 Environmental advocacy groups were-and probably still
are-planning to implement this new strategy nationwide with similar
§ 1983 actions being contemplated in California, Michigan, and New
York." Opponents of this type of liability for non-intentional discrim-
ination are fearful that allowing such claims to proceed will signifi-
cantly deter business expansion in low-income neighborhoods and
could significantly injure businesses that have otherwise complied
with specific pollution and zoning laws.' 2 These fears have been
somewhat allayed, however, because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit recently overturned the aforementioned preliminary in-
junction issued by the district court.13 The Third Circuit has denied a
petition by the South Camden Citizens in Action for a rehearing en
banc,14 and the United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari.
15
But this issue is far from being resolved because the United States
Supreme Court has yet to examine this precise issue under Title VI.
Furthermore, Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by three other justices
in dissent, has suggested that § 1983 could be used to enforce dispa-
rate impact regulations issued pursuant to Title Vt.1
6
9 S. Camden Citizens in Action, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 508 (SCCIA II).
10 Woellert, supra note 5, at 121.
11 See id.
12 Id.
13 S. Camden Citizens in Action, 274 F.3d at 788-90 (holding that plaintiffs could
not maintain an action under 28 U.S.G. § 1983 for violations of disparate impact regu-
lations issued pursuant to section 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). The
Third Circuit further stated that "if there is to be a private enforceable right under
Title VI to be free from disparate impact discrimination, Congress, and not an admin-
istrative agency or a court, must create this right." Id. at 790.
14 Shannon P. Duffy, Third Circuit Won't Hear 'Environmental Racism' Case, 167 NJ.
L.J., Jan. 21, 2002, at 15, 15 (reporting that the Third Circuit denied a request to
rehear the South Camden Citizens in Action case en banc and noting that the "[Third
Circuit's] most important civil rights case from 2001 ... is probably headed for the
U.S. Supreme Court, although it's anyone's guess whether the justices will take it
up").
15 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 70 U.S.L.W. 3669
(U.S. June 24, 2002) (No. 01-1547).
16 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 299-300 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting,
with Souter, J., Ginsberg, J., and Breyer, J., joining)
[T]o the extent that the majority denies relief to the respondents merely
because they neglected to mention 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in framing their Title VI
1603
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Environmental justice plaintiffs' newfound strategic use of § 1983
in an attempt to enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations raises
significant legal concerns regarding the Court's statutory interpreta-
tion of the "and laws" language of § 1983. Additionally, if this strategy
succeeds under Spending Clause legislation, it would essentially enlist
the federal courts in an attempt to interfere with traditional state sov-
ereignty by discounting state autonomy in favor of the will of federal
agencies-all in the absence of a state's clear and unambiguous con-
sent to being sued for disparate impact regulations issued under Title
VI, 17 legislation enacted under Congress's Article I spending power.18
This Note will examine why disparate impact regulations issued
under section 602 of Title VI should not create enforceable federal
rights under § 1983, and why--even if they could-private individuals
cannot likely bring successful § 1983 claims against states to enforce
section 602 disparate impact regulations. Part I provides the neces-
sary background on the concept of environmental justice and the
movement's use of disparate impact claims under Title VI. It also ex-
amines how the recent Supreme Court decision in Alexander v. Sando-
val 9 has led plaintiffs to devise their current legal strategy of using
§ 1983 to enforce disparate impact regulations issued by federal agen-
cies pursuant to section 602. Part II will briefly examine the history of
claim, this case is something of a sport. Litigants who in the future wish to
enforce the Title VI regulations against state actors in all likelihood must
only reference § 1983 to obtain relief ....
Id. Justice Stevens's dissent in Sandoval clearly suggests that the plaintiffs would be
able to re-file the action to enforce section 602 disparate impact regulations under
§ 1983. See id. at 300.
17 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (holding that Congress's
spending power under Article I is limited by several conditions, one being that Con-
gress must provide "unambiguous" conditions so that a state can know the conse-
quences of choosing to receive federal funds); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("By insisting that Congress speak with a clear
voice, we enable the state to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the conse-
quences of their participation."); Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549,
560-61, 576, 587 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (holding that private individuals did not have
standing to sue the State of Michigan to enforce Title XIX of the Social Security Act,
codified at 42 U.S.C. §1396 (1976), because the Ex parte Young doctrine is inapplica-
ble and because Congress did not unambiguously condition its Medicaid funding with
Michigan on the state waiving its sovereign immunity), rev'd, 282 F.3d 852 (6th Cir.
2002).
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and col-
lect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States.").
19 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
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the Court's interpretation of the "and laws" language found in
§ 1983,20 as well as the current circuit split on whether federal regula-
tions alone can provide enforceable federal rights under § 1983.21
The legislative history of § 1983 is unclear, and the Court has relied
upon the plain meaning of "and laws" to extend § 1983's coverage to
enforce violations of federal statutes. 22 But neither the legislative his-
tory23 nor the plain meaning interpretation of the "and laws" lan-
guage supports the additional expansion of § 1983 to include a
private action to remedy violations of federal regulations.
24
Part III examines the plaintiff's argument in South Camden Citizens
in Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, a recent
federal district court decision permitting the use of § 1983 to enforce
Tite VI disparate impact regulations2 5-a strategy that essentially ad-
vances a combination of ideas from the circuit courts recognizing the
possibility that regulations alone can provide enforceable rights under
§ 1983.26 Part III will also examine the Third Circuit's recent opinion
overruling the district court's injunction based upon § 1983.27 Fi-
nally, assuming arguendo that the U.S. Supreme Court were to find
that regulations could create enforceable rights under § 1983, Part IV
turns to the specific question of whether a state or state officials could
be sued under § 1983 for violating the disparate impact regulations
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
21 See Todd E. Pettys, The Intended Relationship Between Administrative Regulations
and Section 1983s "Laws", 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 53 (1998) (describing the circuit
split on whether federal regulations can create rights enforceable under § 1983).
22 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1980) (refusing to rely on the "scanty
legislative history" concerning the addition of the phrase "and laws" because it could
not provide a definitive answer, and relying instead on the plain meaning of the
language).
23 Pettys, supra note 21, at 83 (concluding that the legislative history of § 1983
does not support the inclusion of regulations in the meaning of "and laws").
24 Id.
25 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 505,
549 (D.N.J. 2001) (SCCIA II), rev'd, S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of
Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 70 U.S.L.W. 3669 (U.S.June 24,
2002) (No. 01-1547).
26 See Pettys, supra note 21, at 81 (noting that "if courts are ever to permit regula-
tions to create section 1983 rights, some variation of both analyses is surely required"
in criticizing the differing approaches take by circuits with regard to the issue).
27 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 788 (3d
Cir. 2001) (holding that Tide VI disparate impact regulations did not create a right
enforceable under § 1983), cert. denied, 70 U.S.L.W. 3669 (U.S. June 24, 2002) (No.
01-1547).
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required by Executive Order 12,89828 and promulgated under section
602.
Part IV will demonstrate why the environmental justice move-
ment's specific strategy regarding Title VI disparate impact regula-
tions cannot succeed. First, § 1983 actions filed to enforce violations
of section 602 disparate impact regulations cannot be brought against
a state for damages without a state's consent.2 9 Second, the legal fic-
tion adopted by the Court permitting plaintiffs to sue state officials
acting in their official capacity for prospective relief80 may not apply
with regard to private enforcement of disparate impact regulations
under Title VI, or to Spending Clause legislation in general.31 And
third, it is doubtful that these same § 1983 actions could be filed
against state officials acting in their individual capacities.
32
I. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, TITLE VI REGULATIONS AND ALEXANDER
V. SANDOVAL
In order to address the legal issues involved, some background
discussion of environmental justice and the statutory scheme behind
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is required. Perhaps the best
example of the intersection of disparate impact regulations and the
prevention of "environmental injustice" is found in the first of the two
recent federal district court decisions in South Camden Citizens in Action
v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.
33
28 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 16, 1994). For a discussion
of this executive order see infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
29 See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989) ("[I]n enacting
§ 1983, Congress did not intend to override well-established immunities or defenses
under the common law."). The Court recognized that Congress could not sue a state
without its consent at the time § 1983 was enacted and that state immunity from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment continues to exist absent a clear statutory abroga-
tion. Id. at 67-68.
30 See Ex parteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (holding that an officer acting
unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official capacity or representative character and
is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct").
31 See Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 559-82 (E.D. Mich.
2001) (finding the Ex parte Young legal fiction allowing plaintiffs to sue state officials
in their official capacity despite the Eleventh Amendment to be problematic in the
context of actions brought under Spending Clause legislation), revd, 289 F.3d 852
(6th Cir. 2002).
32 Id. Also, executive officials are typically not held liable under § 1983 unless
"clearly established" constitutional or statutory rights are violated. See, e.g., Crawford-
El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
817-18 (1982)).
33 145 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D.N.J. 2001) (SCCIA I). This was the first opinion issued
by the district court in this case; a second opinion followed after the Supreme Court
16o6 [VOL- 77:5
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In this case, discussed at length in Part III,3 4 EPA regulations pro-
hibited state agencies from making environmental decisions-such as
the issuance of air pollution permits-that have an adverse impact on
a person's health or environment based on their race, color, or na-
tional origin.35 Some residents of South Camden, New Jersey joined
together and filed a Tide VI action against the NewJersey Department
of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) for issuing certain air pollution
permits without considering the racial or ethnic composition of the
neighborhood where the permits would be used.36 The plaintiffs ar-
gued, and the district court agreed, that the NJDEP's failure to con-
sider the racial composition of the town, and the possible
environmental and health effects that the new pollution permit might
have on its residents, was a violation of the EPA disparate impact regu-
lations.37 The NJDEP issued the pollution permits for an area already
saturated with industrial plants and environmental clean-up sites, and
the additional permits produced an adverse effect on the largely mi-
nority population of South Camden, New Jersey.38 This case illus-
trates environmental justice principles at work through the use of
disparate impact regulations. It also sets the framework for the legal
debate on whether disparate impact regulations issued under section
602 of Tide VI can be used to advance environmental justice.
In an attempt to address some of the growing environmental jus-
tice concerns, President William J. Clinton issued Executive Order
No. 12,898 on February 11, 1994, ensuring that disparate impact regu-
lations would be implemented throughout federal agencies to protect
environmental justice claimants. 39 The executive order, entitled "Fed-
eral Actions To Address Environmental Justice in Minority Popula-
tions and Low-Income Populations," required federal agencies to
make achieving environmental justice part of their mission.40 Under
this order, each federal agency must conduct any program that sub-
stantially affects human health or the environment in such a manner
as to ensure that the program does not intentionally discriminate or
decided Alexander v. Sandoval. The second opinion addresses the holding in Sandoval
and upholds the injunctive order granted prior to Sandova but on a § 1983 claim
rather than under Title VI. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,
145 F. Supp. 2d 505, 509 (D.N.J. 2001) (SCCIA II).
34 See infra notes 126-85 and accompanying text.
35 S. Camden Citizens in Action, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 451-52 (SCCIA I).
36 Id. at 450-52.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 459.
39 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
40 Id. at 7629, § 1-101.
16o 7
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
have a discriminatory effect based on a person's race, color, or na-
tional origin.41 Pursuant to the executive order, all federal agencies
must promulgate rules or regulations to prohibit federally funded
state programs from engaging in conduct that merely has an adverse
environmental effect on people based on their income, race, color, or
national origin.
42
In ordering these disparate impact regulations, President Clinton
used the executive power derived from section 602 of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VI generally prohibits discrimination by
state entities in state programs receiving federal funds.43 Because in-
tentional discrimination is difficult to prove in regard to the decision-
making of federally funded state agencies, President Clinton likely
issued the executive order to satisfy a perceived need to protect indi-
viduals from state and local decisions that result in a disparate impact
on the environment or the health of individuals.
44
After the executive order was implemented, the question re-
mained whether individuals affected by the decisions and programs of
the federally funded state agencies could enforce these disparate im-
pact regulations through the courts under Title VI. In other words,
how effective could disparate impact regulations issued pursuant to
section 602 of Title VI be for environmental justice plaintiffs? The
issue was whether plaintiffs could file a direct action against the state
or its officials for failure to comply with disparate impact regulations,
or whether plaintiffs would have to petition the issuing federal agency
to exercise its power to invoke the statutory funding repeal proce-
41 Id. at 7630-31, § 2-2.
42 See id.
43 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994).
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any program or activity by way of grant, loan, or con-
tract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and di-
rected to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d with respect to such
program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applica-
bility which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the stat-
ute authorizing the financial assistance ....
Id. Section 602 of Title VI creates executive authorization for regulations to effectuate
the general prohibition found in section 601 of Title VI. President Clinton's Order
was intended to supplement, but not supercede, Executive Order No. 12,250. See
Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. at 7632, § 6-602. President James E. Carter had
previously delegated his presidential power to approve rules and regulations under
section 602. See Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995, § 1-101 (Nov. 4, 1980).
44 See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. at 7603-31, § 2-2.
16o8 [VOL- 77:5
2002] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE SPENDING POWER
dures found in Title VI itself.4 5 Civil rights plaintiffs, specifically envi-
ronmental justice advocates, were seeking a statutory source to
provide an individual private cause of action for enforcement of these
disparate impact regulations. Without one, plaintiffs would be forced
to petition and rely on the issuing federal agency to enforce the dispa-
rate impact regulations under section 602's funding revocation
procedures.
Section 601 of Title VI provides that "[n] o person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance. '46 The Supreme Court has interpreted
this section to require proof of intentional discrimination in order to
establish a violation under this section of Title VI. 47 Additionally, sec-
tion 602 of Title VI authorizes federal agencies to implement regula-
tions to "effectuate" the provisions of section 601.48 Title VI also
provides a specific remedial procedure for a federal agency seeking to
revoke federal funding as a means to enforce its regulations issued
under its section 602 authority.
49
The Supreme Court has interpreted Title VI to provide an im-
plied private cause of action for individuals under section 601, but
only for actions of intentional discrimination.50 Prior to Alexander v.
45 Title VI specifically outlines a procedure that must be followed prior to revok-
ing state funding. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. The revocation procedure includes an
express finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a [state's]
failure to comply with such requirement ... [p]rovided, [h]owever, [t]hat
no such action [revocation of funds] shall be taken until the department or
agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the fail-
ure to comply.., and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by
voluntary means.
Id. (emphasis omitted). The head of the federal agency revoking the funds must also
file reports With congressional committees having legislative jurisdiction over the pro-
gram or activity. Id.
46 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
47 See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) ("[It is similarly be-
yond dispute-and no party disagrees-that § 601 prohibits only intentional
discrimination.").
48 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
49 Id.; see also supra note 45.
50 See Sandoval 532 U.S. at 284 ("We do not doubt that regulations applying
§ 601's ban on intentional discrimination are covered by the cause of action to en-
force that section."); Guardians Ass'n. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y. City, 463 U.S.
582, 610-11 (1983) (PowellJ., concurring, with Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.,join-
ing) (agreeing With the Second Circuit's determination that a showing of intentional
discrimination is a prerequisite to a successful Title VI claim).
16og
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Sandoval, however, the federal courts were split on whether an individ-
ual could bring a private cause of action for violations of regulations
issued by federal agencies under section 602 of Title VI. In other
words, it was unclear whether Congress, in passing Title VI, intended
to create a private cause of action for individuals for violations of sec-
tion 602 regulations.
51
The divided Court decision in Sandoval, however, settled the issue
by determining that private individuals do not have a private cause of
action for violations of disparate impact regulations under section
602.52 In Sandoval, the Court reviewed a challenge to an Alabama
state procedure requiring all drivers' license examinations to be is-
sued and taken in English. 53 Non-English speaking citizens filed a
claim under Tide VI, alleging that the Alabama policy violated regula-
tions issued by the U.S. Department of Justice that prohibited state
policies resulting in a discriminatory effect based on a person's na-
tional origin.54 The Court held that Congress did not intend-and
the Court itself refused to imply-a private cause of action under Title
VI for the enforcement of section 602 disparate impact regulations.
55
Although Sandoval did not specifically address an environmental jus-
tice issue, its holding essentially eliminated private actions under Title
VI for any federal disparate impact regulations issued in accordance
with Executive Order 12,898.56
In deciding Sandoval, the Court not only resolved a split among
the circuits as to whether Title VI supplied a private right of action for
regulations issued under section 602, but also created widespread dis-
appointment among civil rights advocates.57 Their disappointment
stems from a perceived lack of remedy on the part of private individu-
51 See Bradford C. Mank, Using § 1983 To Enforce Title V's Section 602 Regulations,
49 KAN. L. REV. 321, 321-23 (2001) (predicting the Supreme Court's rejection of an
implied private right of action under Title VI for section 602 regulations and advocat-
ing the use of § 1983 for their enforcement). Compare Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387,
397-400 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting the defendants' argument that a private right of
action does not exist under Title VI to enforce section 602 regulations), withJackson
v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 951 F. Supp. 1293, 1298-99 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that
implied actions under Title VI are limited to intentional discrimination).
52 Sandoval 532 U.S. at 293 (5-4 decision).
53 Id. at 279.
54 Id.; see also Department ofJustice Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Pro-
grams, 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (2) (2001).
55 Sandova, 532 U.S. at 293.
56 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
57 See Shannon P. Duffy, "Environmental Racism" Ruling, N.J. L.J., Oct. 1, 2001 at
11, 11 (describing the decision as racist); Charles Toutant, Civil Rights Lawyers Commis-
erate over Roadblocks Erected by Court, N.J. L.J., Oct. 8, 2001, at 87.
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als who are harmed when a federally funded state agency violates dis-
parate impact regulations issued by a federal agency under section
602.58 The Court, however, did not eliminate all remedies under Title
VI, rather it recognized congressional intent not to provide a private
cause of action for violations of section 602 regulations.59
Fearing that the procedural remedy available to federal agencies
would be too slow and ineffective, environmental justice plaintiffs
have devised a new strategy. This strategy seeks enforcement of sec-
tion 602 disparate impact regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.60 This
new theory contends that federal regulations would provide enforcea-
ble federal rights under § 1983, and at least one federal district court
has bought this argument and recognized that private individuals can
enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations under § 1983.61
Additionally, despite the Third Circuit's recent opinion foreclos-
ing such use of § 1983, four justices of the Supreme Court appear to
support the use of § 1983 to enforce Title VI disparate impact regula-
ions, as evidenced by the dissent in SandovaL62 This new use of
§ 1983 is likely to gain the attention of the Supreme Court because
recognition of a § 1983 cause of action would essentially circumvent
the Court's recent holding in Sandoval. The issue has also revived an
older dispute on whether federal regulations, in general, can create
enforceable rights under § 1983.63 The Court first touched upon this
more general issue in Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in Guardi-
ans Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission of New York,64 and the issue re-
emerged briefly in the Court's decision in Wright v. City of Roanoke
58 All Things Considered. Environmental Law (National Public Radio broadcast, May
7, 2001).
59 See Sandova4 532 U.S. at 293.
60 See, e.g., S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp.
2d 505, 509 (D.N.J. 2001) (SCCIA II) (granting a continuance of a preliminary in-
junction sought using this strategy); Woellert, supra note 5, at 120.
61 S. Canuen Citizens in Action, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 509 (SCCIA II).
62 See Sandoval 532 U.S. at 299-300 (Stevens, J., dissenting, with Souter, J., Gins-
berg, J., and Breyer, J., joining). Justice Stevens stated,
[T]o the extent that the majority denies relief to the respondents merely
because they neglected to mention 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in framing their Title VI
claim, this case is something of a sport. Litigants who in the future wish to
enforce the Title VI regulations against state actors in all likelihood must
only reference § 1983 to obtain relief....
Id. Justice Stevens's dissent in Sandoval clearly suggests that the plaintiffs would be
able to re-file the action under § 1983. See id. at 300.
63 Using § 1983 to enforce disparate impact regulations issued under section 602
of Title VI raises a question that has been treated differently by the federal courts. See
Pettys, supra note 21, at 53 (discussing the circuit split).
64 463 U.S. 582, 645 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Redevelopment and Housing Authority.65 These two decisions have
helped lead to the current confusion and split among the circuit
courts as to whether federal regulations alone can provide enforcea-
ble rights under § 1983.66
The validity of section 602 disparate impact regulations as proper
regulations under principles of administrative law has also been ques-
tioned.67 In fact, the majority opinion in Sandoval assumes the validity
of the section 602 regulations at issue, but only for the purposes of
deciding the case. 68 The presumed validity of the regulations, al-
though not fully addressed here, is coupled with a strong argument
that disparate impact regulations could be "reasonably related" to the
purposes of Tide VI. This indicates that the regulations could be au-
thorized-that is, at least valid to the extent that they would be en-
forceable under Title VI's specific revocation remedy found in section
602.69
Assuming the validity of section 602 disparate impact regulations,
the use of § 1983 to enforce these regulations still raises important
issues with regard to statutory interpretation 70 and the legitimacy of
their enforcement, especially in light of the fact that the regulations
are authorized pursuant to Congress's Article I spending power. 7' En-
forcing section 602 disparate impact regulations by using § 1983,
when the regulations are only authorized pursuant to the Spending
Clause power, raises concerns with regard to the legitimacy of the fed-
eral government's authority in forcing state conduct without state con-
sent though Tite VI's conditional grant of financial assistance.
Although Title VI contains a condition specifically requiring a state to
65 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
66 Pettys, supra note 21, at 52, 76-82 (describing and commenting on the three
basic views taken by the circuit courts as to whether federal regulations can create
enforceable rights under § 1983).
67 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 612-15 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
("[I]t is difficult to fathom how the Court could uphold administrative regulations
that would proscribe conduct by the recipient having only a discriminatory effect.
Such regulations do not simply 'further' the purpose of the Title VI; they go well
beyond that purpose.").
68 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001).
69 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the regula-
tions would reasonably relate to the purposes of Title VI and would thus be author-
ized under Morning v. Family Publications Services, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973)).
70 Pettys, supra note 21, at 51-52, 82-99 (arguing that a review of the historical
record demonstrates that Congress did not intend to provide a remedy for federal
regulations by using the words "and laws" in passing the legislation now known as
§ 1983).
71 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 598-99 (stating that the legislative history "clearly
shows" that Title VI is Spending Clause legislation).
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cede its sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment 2 in or-
der to receive federal funds,73 42 U.S.C § 1983 does not.74 Further-
more, there is recent case law recognizing that the Ex parte Youn
5
fiction, which was adopted by the Court to allow plaintiffs to obtain
prospective relief by suing state officials as defendants in their official
capacity, may not apply in actions seeking to enforce regulations
under Spending Clause legislation absent a state's consent to individ-
ual legal enforcement of such regulations.
76
72 This Note describes state sovereign immunity in terms of "Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity." This description is meant as shorthand for the immunity that states
have under the history and the structure of the Constitution. See Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
The phrase [Eleventh Amendment immunity] is convenient shorthand but
something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither
derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.
Rather, as the Constitution's structure, its history, and the authoritative in-
terpretations by this Court make clear, the States' immunity from suit is a
fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the
ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today ....
Id.
73 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a) (1) (1994) ("A State shall not be immune under the
Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution ... from suit in Federal court for a violation
of... title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the provisions of any other Federal
statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance." (cita-
tion omitted)).
74 In fact, Congress could have abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity under
its enforcement power in section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it did not. See
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that Congress can override
state immunity through its power to enforce the Civil War amendments). The Court
has also held that § 1983 was not intended to abrogate state immunity. Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675-77 (1974). Congress, however, cannot abrogate immunity
under its Article I powers. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll.
Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999) (noting that Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
72-73 (1996), "makes clear" that Congress cannot unilaterally abrogate state sover-
eign immunity under Article I powers).
75 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (holding that officers of a state may be enjoined
from conduct in a § 1983 suit and that the Eleventh Amendment is not a bar to such
an action-essentially allowing for a state official to be sued in an official capacity
under § 1983 for prospective relief).
76 See, e.g., Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
(questioning the application of Ex parte Young's legal fiction in a case where the state
has not consented to private enforcement of rights created in federal Spending
Clause legislation), rev'd, 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2002).
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II. THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF "AND LAWS" AND THE
CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Courts Adoption of Plain Meaning Interpretation
Initially, § 1983 came onto the books as section 1 of the Ku Klux
Klan Act of April 20, 1871, or what is often called the Civil Rights Act
of 1871. 77 It is commonly accepted that Congress enacted this legisla-
tion to alleviate the state-sanctioned discrimination occurring in the
southern states following the adoption of the Civil War amend-
ments. 78 As originally enacted, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 provided a
cause of action only for deprivations of constitutional rights, and the
phrase "and laws" was added in 1874. 79 Despite the debate surround-
ing the legislative history of Congress's addition of "and laws," the
Court has interpreted this phrase according to its plain meaning when
determining the scope of federal rights that are enforceable under
§ 1983.80
In Maine v. Thiboutot, the Court ignored the "scanty" legislative
history and expanded the coverage of § 1983 to include statutory
rights. 81 Although this expansion of federal rights was significant and
gave rise to serious concerns about excessive federal litigation and in-
fringement of state sovereignty, 82 the Court's interpretation, absent
clear legislative intent to the contrary, can be somewhatjustified. Few
would argue that the word "laws" does not include laws, statutes, or
other legislative acts within the word's plain meaning. The word
"laws" may not, however, plainly mean "regulations," and further ex-
pansion of § 1983 to include actions for violations of federal regula-
77 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1994)).
78 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961) (noting that § 1983 was enacted
pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to "enforce the provisions of
that Amendment"); Pettys, supra note 21, at 54-56 & n.37 ("[T]he Ku Klux Klan,
aided by the inaction or outright complicity of state and local officials, remained a
dominant force in the South.").
79 See Rev. Stat. 1979 (1874) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)); see also
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1874).
80 Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 6-8 (refusing to rely on the "scanty legislative history"
and turning instead to the plain meaning of the language used).
81 See id. ("In short, Congress was aware of what it was doing, and the legislative
history does not demonstrate that the plain language was not intended.").
82 Justice Lewis F. Powell expressed these concerns in his dissenting opinion: "No
one can predict the extent to which litigation arising from today's decision will harass
state and local officials; nor can one foresee the number of new filings in our already
overburdened courts." Id. at 23 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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tons alone may go well beyond plain meaning interpretation by the
Court.
In conjunction with the plain meaning of the language, federal
courts have relied on the notion that Congress passed § 1983 to pro-
vide a remedy for a broad array of constitutional and statutory viola-
tions.8 3 This broad remedial purpose has been incorporated as a
dominant factor used by some federal judges in recognizing that fed-
eral regulations can create federal rights under § 1983,84 while other
judges have construed the plain meaning of "and laws" to exclude
"regulations." These latter judges have recognized that regulations
alone are probably not "laws" under the meaning of § 1983 and do not
create federally enforceable § 1983 rights.
8 5
There is a strong case that, historically, Congress did not intend
for federal agencies to promulgate rules or regulations that give pri-
vate individuals a right of action under the "and laws" language of
§ 1983.86 The further expansion of the Court's interpretation of "and
laws" under § 1983 to include the creation of enforceable rights based
on regulations without a close nexus to a statutory right, would likely
create volumes of new rights with their substantive determination left
to the ever-changing will of federal executive agencies. Congress can
intend for the executive branch to enforce federal law through pro-
mulgation of regulations, but it is not clear that § 1983 would support
enforceable rights based on those regulations alone. Not only is it
unlikely that Congress intended "and laws" to include regulations, but
the Court's expansion of that language to include federal regulations
will likely open the floodgates for more federal litigation.
83 See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 649 (1980) (stating that
§ 1983 is a means of insuring that municipalities conform to constitutional and statu-
tory requirements).
84 See, e.g., Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 551 (6th Cir. 1994) (rea-
soning that because "federal regulations have the force of law, they likewise may cre-
ate enforceable rights"); W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 17, 22 (3d
Cir. 1989) (permitting the plaintiff to assert a cause of action under § 1983 for an
"alleged violation of a federal medical statute, the Medicaid Act").
85 See Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1005-09 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding that
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority did not stand for the gen-
eral proposition that federal regulations could create enforceable rights under § 1983
on their own force); Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1987) ("An administra-
tive regulation ... cannot create an enforceable § 1983 interest not already implicit in
the enforcing statute.").
86 See generally Pettys, supra note 21 (arguing that the language of § 1983 and the
historical context in which Congress passed the statute establish that Congress did not
intend "and laws" to include regulations).
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B. Early Treatment of the § 1983 Law/Regulation Distinction
The law versus regulation issue first emerged in Justice Stevens's
dissenting opinion in Guardians.87 The plaintiffs in this case filed ac-
tions based on both Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,88 as well as under § 1983.89 The class action suit was filed after
New York City administered entry-level police officer examinations
that had a discriminatory effect on black and Hispanic applicants.90
After their first judgment was vacated, the plaintiffs ultimately ob-
tained relief in the district court on Title VI and Title VII grounds, but
only the Title VII basis for relief was upheld by the court of appeals.91
The Title VI and § 1983 claims were rejected by the circuit court.92 A
plurality of the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on Title VII
grounds, with disagreement on the issue of whether Title VI was a
proper basis for the claim.93 Because of the Title VII issues, the Court
did not need to decide the scope of Title VI's implied cause of action
or whether section 602 regulations could create enforceable § 1983
rights.
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the plain meaning inter-
pretation of "and laws" applied by the Court in Thibotout should be
applied to § 1983 actions for the "deprivation of rights secured by all
valid federal laws, including statutes and regulations having the force
of law," and that the circuit court decision should be reversed.94 A
regulation is said to have the force and effect of law when it meets the
test set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown.95 The plurality in Guardians, consisting of only three justices
recognizing that federal regulations alone could create federal rights
enforceable under § 1983, affirmed the lower court's decision on
other grounds and did not provide a definitive answer on whether
87 Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 639-45 (1983).
88 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (1994); id. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
89 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 586.
90 Id. at 585.
91 Id. at 587-88.
92 Id. at 588-89.
93 Id. at 584 & n.2.
94 Id. at 638 & n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95 441 U.S. 281, 301-06 (1979). The three-part test to determine if a statute cre-
ates rights enforceable under § 1983 could apply to a regulation that meets the
Chrysler test. This three-part test is discussed in Part II.C. See infra notes 115-17 and
accompanying text.
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regulations could create enforceable rights under § 1983, leaving the
issue for another day.
96
The issue of whether regulations could create federal rights
under § 1983 was more directly implicated in Wright v. City of Roanoke
Redevelopment and Housing Authority.9 7 In Wright, the plaintiffs alleged
a violation of the Brooke Amendment of the Housing Act of 1937.98
Public housing tenants claimed that they had been overcharged for
rent in violation of federal law because the public housing authority
did not take account of their utility costs.99 The Brooke Amendment
imposed a statutory limit on rent charged to low-income public hous-
ing tenants. 00 The Department of Housing and Urban Development
had consistently promulgated regulations defining the term "rent" to
include reasonable utility costs.10 The plaintiff-tenants filed a § 1983
action alleging a violation of their statutory rights for the over-billing
that occurred when their utility expenses were not considered in their
rent. 0 2 The district court granted summary judgment for the defen-
dant, and the court of appeals affirmed recognizing that although the
tenants had federal rights under the Brooke Amendment, those rights
were only enforceable by the Housing Authority.
03
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Housing Act and
the Brooke Amendment did not provide a sufficiently comprehensive
and effective remedial scheme to demonstrate that Congress intended
to foreclose the use of § 1983.104 While most of the majority's deci-
sion was dedicated to determining whether the statute foreclosed the
use of § 1983,105 little discussion is found on whether the Court held
96 Id. at 584. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice William J. Brennan and Justice
Harry A. Blackmun would have expanded § 1983 to allow federal regulations to create
enforceable rights. "It is clear that the § 1983 remedy is intended to redress the dep-
rivation of rights secured by all valid federal laws, including statutes and regulations
having the force of law." Id. at 638.
97 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
98 Id. at 419.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 420 & n.2; see 42 U.S.C. § 1437a (1994).
101 Wright, 479 U.S. at 420-21.
102 Id. at 419.
103 Id. at 422.
104 Id. at 424-25.
105 The federal courts generally use a two-step analysis for determining if a statute
creates a federal right for § 1983 purposes. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981). First, courts determine if a federal
right exists. See id. To make this determination, the court applies the three-part test
outlined in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997). See infra notes 115-17
and accompanying text. Second, the court determines if Congress has expressly or
impliedly foreclosed a § 1983 remedy under the statute. See Middlesex County Sewerage
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that the right enforceable under § 1983 was derived from the statutory
limit on the term "rent," or whether the right was derived from the
regulations adopted to define the meaning of "rent."
10 6
The unclear reasoning found in the Court's split decision in
Wright, coupled with a strong dissent suggesting that regulations alone
could not give rise to enforceable rights under § 1983, suggests that
federal regulations would only create enforceable rights under § 1983
when the regulations are consistent with the existing statutory rights.
10 7
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor best expresses this in her dissenting
opinion:
I am concerned, however, that lurking behind the Court's analysis
may be the view that, once it has been found that a statute creates
some enforceable right, any regulation adopted within the purview
of the statute creates rights enforceable in federal courts, regardless
of whether Congress or the promulgating agency ever contem-
plated such a result. Thus, HUD's frequently changing views on
how best to administer the provision of utilities . . . becomes the
focal point for the creation and extinguishment of federal "rights."
Such a result, where determination of § 1983 "rights" has been un-
leashed from any connection to congressional intent, is troubling
indeed.
108
Section 601 of Title VI allows conduct that section 602 forbids in
the form of disparate impact regulations, and therefore the regula-
tions are not inherently consistent with section 601.109 If federal agen-
cies create regulations that forbid intentional discrimination, those
regulations would be actionable under § 1983 not because a right
would derive from the regulation, but because such regulations would
mirror the statutory rights-in particular, Title VI creates a statutory
right to be free from intentional discrimination, but not from any and
all unintentional discriminatory effects. 110 The Wright majority's un-
clear reasoning and incomplete analysis surrounding the source of
Auth., 453 U.S. at 20. In Wright, the Court's reasoning as to the source of the federal
right resulted in confusion among lower courts on whether regulations can create
enforceable rights under § 1983.
106 See Middlesex County Sewarage Auth., 453 U.S. at 20; Pettys, supra note 21, at
73-75 (commenting on the Court's "slippery" analysis in Wright regarding the mean-
ing of the term "rent").
107 Wright, 479 U.S. at 438 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
108 Id. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
109 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 276 (2001) (suggesting that section
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the enforceable right at issue has lead to the current circuit court split
described next.'
1 '
C. Current Circuit Court Split
The federal courts of appeals are currently split as to whether
federal regulations can supply a statutory right under § 1983, and
their approaches to resolve the issue are threefold. 112 The first ap-
proach taken by the Sixth and, until recently, the Third Circuit,
113
simply applies the same test that courts would apply to statutes in de-
termining if federal regulations can create enforceable § 1983
rights." 4 The test applied to determine if a statute creates federal
rights enforceable under § 1983 is the three-part test enumerated in
Blessing v. Freestone.'15 A federally enforceable right exists under Bless-
ing if. (1) the statute was intended to benefit the plaintiffs; (2) the
right protected is not so vague or amorphous that is strains judicial
competence to enforce; and (3) the statute unambiguously imposes a
111 Pettys, supra note 21, at 73 (stating that Wright "has not provided the guidance
that the lower courts plainly need").
112 Id. at 76.
113 The Third Circuit's most recent opinion on this issue distinguishes prior cases
that were seemingly in support of the first approach discussed, see S. Camden Citizens
in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 783-85, 788 (3d Cir. 2001) (hold-
ing that the section 602 disparate impact regulations issued by the EPA cannot create
federal rights on their own), cert. denied, 70 U.S.L.W. 3669 (U.S. June 24, 2002) (No.
01-1547), and specifically adopts the second approach discussed which is the same
approach taken by the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits. See Harris v. James, 127 F.3d
993, 1005-09 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding that Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment
& Housing Authority did not stand for the general proposition that federal regulations
could create enforceable rights under § 1983 on their own force); Smith v. Kirk, 821
F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1987) ("An administrative regulation ... cannot create an
enforceable § 1983 interest not already implicit in the enforcing statute."). Note,
however, that this Third Circuit decision had a split panel and that the dissenting
judge sharply criticized the majority for overruling precedent without an en banc
hearing. Id. at 792 (McKee, J., dissenting). The entire court has refused a petition
for rehearing en banc. Duffy, supra note 14, at 15.
114 See Pettys, supra note 21, at 76; see also Levin v. Childers, 101 F.3d 44, 47 (6th
Cir. 1996) (stating that the Sixth Circuit uses the three-part rights test to determine if
a federal regulation can be enforced under § 1983, but dismissing the claim on quali-
fied immunity grounds); Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 550-51 (6th Cir.
1994) (holding that FCC regulations prohibiting the enforcement of local zoning or-
dinances created federal rights enforceable under § 1983 for plaintiffs claiming con-
stitutional violations when a local ordinance required removal of a ten-foot diameter
backyard satellite dish antenna); Alexander v. Polk, 750 F.2d 250, 259-60 (3d Cir.
1984) (holding that federal regulation requiring notification of hearings for WIC re-
cipients gave rise to federal rights enforceable under § 1983).
115 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
161g
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
binding obligation on the governmental unit.116 Relying on the Su-
preme Court's decision in Wright, the Third and the Sixth Circuits
have issued opinions that arguably support the position that federal
regulations can create federal § 1983 rights under a plain meaning
interpretation of § 1983's "and laws" language, and the Sixth Circuit
has specifically applied the three-part Blessing test to regulations to
determine if such regulations provide federal rights.' 1
7
A second position, adopted by the Courts of Appeals for the
Fourth, Eleventh, and most recently the Third Circuit," 8 holds that
regulations simply cannot supply an enforceable right under § 1983
without clear legislative intent.1 9 This view correctly requires that
Congress, manifested through a legislative act, intentionally create the
source of the right. It rejects the idea that federal regulations could
create § 1983 rights by their own force. As a more restrictive ap-
proach, it only permits federal agencies to "define" an existing statu-
tory right, and any such definition cannot subsequently affect a
substantive change in a congressionally created statutory right.120
A third view, adopted by the D.C. Circuit, merely asks whether
the regulations have the "force and effect" of law under the test set
forth in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, and if the regulations pass this test,
they create an enforceable federal right under § 1983.121 This view is
unique in that it assumes that if a regulation has the force and effect
of law, then the three-part Blessing test is presumptively met.122 This
approach is effectively subsumed by the first approach recognizing
that federal regulations can potentially create federal rights enforcea-
ble under § 1983.
If the Court recognizes that federal regulations can create en-
forceable § 1983 rights, it could require a two-step process: essentially
116 See id. at 340-41; Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990).
117 See Loschiavo, 33 F.3d at 551; Polk, 750 F.2d at 259-60.
118 S. Camden Citizens in Action, 274 F.3d at 783-85; see supra note 113 and accom-
panying text.
119 See, e.g., Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1005-09 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding
that Wright did not stand for the general proposition that federal regulations could
create enforceable rights under § 1983 on their own force); Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d
980, 984 (4th Cir. 1987) ("An administrative regulation ... cannot create an enforcea-
ble § 1983 interest not already implicit in the enforcing statute.").
120 See Smith, 821 F.2d at 984; see also Mank, supra note 51, at 325.
121 Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 199-200 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (hold-
ing that federal housing regulations requiring an administrative grievance procedure
had the force and effect of law and thus were covered by the plain meaning of "and
laws" under § 1983).
122 See Pettys, supra note 21, at 81.
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combining the first and third views discussed 123 by asking if the fed-
eral regulation has the force and effect of law, and then applying the
statutory analysis required to determine if a federal right exists under
the three-part Blessing test.12 4 This is the approach that the federal
district court recently used to grant an injunction in favor of the
South Camden Citizens in Action in its § 1983 action against the
NJDEP.125 -
III. SOUTH CAMDEN CIrIZENS 1N ACTION V. NEWJERsEY DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
The effects of the Court's decision in Alexander v. Sandoval were
immediate, and it did not take long for plaintiffs to assert their new
§ 1983 legal theory in attempting to enforce section 602 disparate im-
pact regulations under Title VI. This is evidenced by the U.S. District
Court for the District of NewJersey's recent decisions in South Camden
Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (SC-
CIA I and SCCIA II).126 On April 19, 2001, prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Sandoval, the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey issued a decision, in which it enjoined the NJDEP from
issuing air pollution permits to a company set to open a new cement
plant in South Camden (SCCIA I).127 The initial injunction was
granted after the plaintiffs filed an action under Title VI alleging that
the NJDEP had violated certain federal EPA regulations forbidding
conduct having a discriminatory effect on people of low-income or
color.128 Five days later on April 24, 2001, the Supreme Court issued
its decision in Sandova; eliminating an implied private cause of action
under Title VI for section 602 regulations.129 Subsequently, on May
10, 2001, prompted by the Sandoval decision and after allowing South
123 See supra notes 113-16, 121-22 and accompanying text.
124 See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d
505, 509 (D.N.J. 2001) (SCCIA II), rev'd, S. Camden Citizens in Action v. NJ. Dep't of
Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 70 U.S.L.W. 3669 (U.S. June 24,
2002) (No. 01-1547); see also Pettys, supra note 21, at 81. ("No court, however, has
applied both analyses. Yet if courts are ever to permit regulations to create section
1983 rights, some variation of both analyses is surely required.").
125 The district court did not formally provide that both steps of the approach
were advanced, but both steps can be inferred. See S. Camden Citizens in Action, 145 F.
Supp. 2d at 509 (SCCIA II).
126 See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envti. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d
446 (D.NJ. 2001) (SCCIA I); S. Camden Citizens in Action, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 505
(SCCIA II).
127 S. Camden Citizens in Action, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 452 (SCCIA I).
128 Id. at 450-51.
129 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
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Camden Citizens in Action to amend its complaint, the district court
issued a second decision upholding the injunction based on a viola-
tion of § 1983 (SCCIA II).130 This Part first examines the factual back-
ground surrounding the district court's first opinion, and then
examines the legal argument advanced in favor of allowing plaintiffs
to use § 1983 to enforce disparate impact regulations issued pursuant
to section 602. Finally, it discusses the Third Circuit's recent split
panel decision reversing the district court's grant of the injunction.
A. South Camden Citizens in Action I (SCCIA I)
In SCCIA I, a group of citizens from the Waterfront South neigh-
borhood in South Camden filed suit against the NJDEP, its chief of-
ficer, and the Saint Lawrence Cement Company under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.131 The plaintiffs alleged that the NJDEP is-
sued pollution permits for a new cement factory proposed by Saint
Lawrence Cement in violation of certain federal EPA regulations.
13 2
The federal regulations implicated in the case prohibit federally
funded state entities from taking action that results in a discriminatory
effect on individuals based on their race, color, or national origin.
133
The EPA regulations on which the plaintiffs relied specifically pro-
hibit recipients of federal funds from utilizing "criteria and methods"
which have the "purpose or effect" of discriminating against individu-
als on the basis of race, color, or national origin. 34
Approximately ninety percent of Waterfront South's residents
were persons of color.13 5 Numerous industrial plants had aiready ex-
isted in the neighborhood, including two "Superfund" sites, a sewage
treatment plant, and a trash-to-steam incinerator plant.13 6 The fed-
eral EPA was also investigating four industrial sites in Waterfront
130 S. Camden Citizens in Action, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 549 (SCCIA II).
131 S. Camden Citizens in Action, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 450 (SCCIA I).
132 Id. at 450-51.
133 See Nondiscrimination in Programs Receiving Federal Assistance from the En-
vironmental Protection Agency, 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.30, 7.35(b) (2001).
134 Id. § 7.35(b).
A recipient shall not use criteria or methods of administering its program
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of
their race, color, national origin, or sex, or have the effect of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program
with respect to individuals of a particular race, color, national origin, or sex.
Id.
135 S. Camden Citizens in Action, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 459 (SCCIA I).
136 Id.
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South for possible pollution violations.' 3 7 The citizens claimed that
the NJDEP's decision to issue air pollution permits to the new cement
plant without considering the discriminatory effect on the health and
the environment of the neighborhood's residents violated the federal
regulations issued under section 602 of Title VI.'3
8
The district court held that the EPA regulations imposed an af-
firmative obligation on the NJDEP-as a recipient of federal funds-
to consider the totality of the effects that its permitting decision would
have on the personal health and environment of the citizens of Water-
front South.13 9 The NJDEP granted the pollution permits after con-
cluding that the factory's emissions would not exceed the regulatory
standards for the specific pollutants in question.140 The district court
held that consideration of the National Ambient Air Quality Stan-
dards alone was not sufficient to fulfill the NJDEP's obligation under
the EPA regulations.' 41 The NJDEP failed to consider the preexisting
poor health of the residents, the cumulative environmental burden
already borne by the community, and the racial and ethnic composi-
tion of the neighborhood where the permits would be issued.
42
Holding that the NJDEP did not meet its obligation under the regula-
tions, and relying on Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent rec-
ognizing that an implied cause of action existed under Title VI, the
district court enjoined issuance of the pollution permits and prohib-
ited the cement company from beginning construction on its new
plant.143
B. South Camden Citizens in Action II (SCCOA II) and the
§ 1983 Argument
After considering the impact of the Sandoval decision and after
permitting the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to include a § 1983
claim against the NJDEP, the district court issued a second opinion in
the South Camden Citizens in Action case upholding the previously
137 Id.
138 Id. at 450.
139 Id. at 451-52.
140 See id. at 458.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 490-91.
143 Id. at 504-05; see Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974) (applying Title VII
disparate impact analysis to a Title VI claim without discussion-essentially overruled
by the Court's recent decision in Sandovat); Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 397-400
(3d Cir. 1999) (applying factors from Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), and determin-
ing that Title VI provided an implied private cause of action for disparate impact
regulations).
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granted injunction.'4 The district court's opinion determined that
the EPA regulations in question had the "force and effect of law" and
that the section 602 disparate impact regulations also satisfied the
three-part Blessing test used to establish a federal right for § 1983 pur-
poses. 145 In its second opinion, the court held that the decision in
Sandoval did not preclude the citizens of Waterfront South from pur-
suing a claim of disparate impact discrimination in violation of the
EPA regulation under § 1983.146
The district court noted that the Supreme Court had not invali-
dated the EPA's disparate impact regulations issued under section 602
in Sandoval and, without significant discussion, went on to hold that
the regulations before it were valid.' 47 The district court reasoned
that because the Supreme Court assumed the validity of the regula-
tions in Sandoval, and limited the issue to whether Congress intended
a private right of action, the section 602 disparate impact regulations
were not invalidated.' 48 Without addressing the validity of section 602
disparate impact regulations, the district court presumed the regula-
tions to be valid and determined that the inquiry on whether an ac-
tion may be brought under § 1983 is "separate and distinct" from the
inquiry applied by the Court to determine if Congress intended to
create a private cause of action in Tide VI for section 602 regula-
tions. 149 Congress has clearly supplied a private right of action for
individuals under § 1983. The central issue is whether section 602
regulations create enforceable federal rights under § 1983.
In an action filed under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
she has asserted a claim against a "person" who "under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Terri-
tory or the District of Columbia," deprived the plaintiff of "rights, priv-
ileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the
United States. 150 Courts apply a two-step inquiry in determining if
144 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 505,
509 (D.N.J. 2001) (SCCIA II), rev'd, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 70
U.S.L.W. 3669 (U.S.June 24, 2002) (No. 01-1547).
145 Id. at 528-29, 535-42.
146 Id. at 516-17.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 520-21 (holding that the congressional intent analysis required for an
implied private cause of action is not required under § 1983 because Congress specifi-
cally provided a statutory basis for the private cause of action); see also Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (identifying four factors for consideration by federal courts in de-
termining if Congress intended to imply a private cause of action under a federal
statute).
150 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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§ 1983 is available to remedy a constitutional or statutory violation:
(1) the plaintiff must meet all statutory requirements including the
assertion of a federal right; and (2) even if a federal right is asserted,
the defendant has an opportunity to show that either Congress ex-
pressly or implicitly foreclosed § 1983 remedies by providing a suffi-
ciently comprehensive enforcement mechanism for protection of the
federal right within the statute itself.151 The first step requires a viola-
tion of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law, and this is
determined by applying the three-part Blessing test.
152
South Camden Citizens in Action sued the NJDEP as well as its
commissioner, Robert Shinn, as "persons" under § 1983. While state
officials sued in their official capacities are not proper defendants in a
§ 1983 action, state officials sued in their official capacities for injunc-
tive or prospective relief have been held to be proper defendants
,under § 1983.153 The plaintiffs sought prospective injunctive relief,
and thus the district court held that the NJDEP Commissioner was not
shielded by the state's sovereign immunity.154 Having established a
proper defendant in the action, the court next turned to the question
of whether or not the EPA disparate impact regulations issued pursu-
ant to the authority found in section 602 of Title VI could establish
federal rights enforceable under § 1983.
The court relied on Third Circuit precedent and mistakenly de-
termined that the decision in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment
and Housing Authority had conclusively established that federal regula-
tions could create enforceable rights under § 1983. 5-5 The district
court proceeded to apply the two approaches taken by different cir-
cuits on this issue. First, it applied the Chrysler test to determine if the
EPA regulations had the force and effect of law.156 Second, after es-
tablishing that the regulations in question satisfied this test, the court
turned to the three-part Blessing test to determine if the EPA regula-
tions having the force and effect of law created a federal right enforce-
151 See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
20 (1981) (providing that § 1983 claims can be precluded if the underlying statute
provides a comprehensive remedial scheme); Mank, supra note 51, at 335. Congres-
sional express or implied foreclosure of § 1983 actions for Title VI is not at issue.
Title VI does not contain an express foreclosure of such a remedy and it also allows
for compliance with section 602 regulations to be achieved by "other means author-
ized by law." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994).
152 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997); see also supra notes 115-17.
153 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
154 S. Camden Citizens in Action, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (SCCIA II).
155 Id. at 526-27.
156 Id. at 528-29.
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able under § 1983.157 The court concluded that the EPA disparate
impact regulations satisfied the three-part test and that the plaintiffs
were entitled to relief under § 1983.158 The district court concluded
its analysis by holding that the specific remedy provided in section
602, revocation of federal funds, did not provide a comprehensive re-
medial scheme indicating congressional intent to rebut the presump-
tion of enforceability under § 1983.159
C. The Third Circuit's Reversal of SCCIA II
The Third Circuit overruled the district court's decision to grant
a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs' "legally insufficient"
case foreclosed any finding of a likelihood of success on the merits.
160
The court specifically focused on the issue of "whether a regulation
can create a right enforceable through section 1983 where the alleged
right does not appear explicitly in the statute, but only .. . in the
regulation.' 6 1 The court resolved the issue in the negative, relying
heavily on the Wright dissenters and the approaches taken by the
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits. 62
The panel majority specifically addressed and distinguished three
prior circuit opinions that seemingly supported an affirmative answer
to the issue as stated by the court-a view that would parallel the Sixth
Circuit's approach, as discussed above.163 First, in Alexander v. Polk,16 4
the court had previously held that federal regulations governing the
Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children
(WIC) created rights enforceable under § 1983.165 The current court,
while admitting that the previous decision had not expressly identified
the federal WIC rights as stemming from the statute, noted that the
decision did not specifically address the issue of whether a federal reg-
ulation could itself create a federal right enforceable under § 1983.166
157 Id.
158 Id. at 535-42.
159 Id. at 544 (noting that the Supreme Court has only twice found a remedial
statutory scheme sufficiently comprehensive to supplant a § 1983 remedy); see also
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 347 (1997) (citing Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981)).
160 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 777 (3d
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 70 U.S.L.W. 3669 (U.S. June 24, 2002) (No. 01-1547).
161 Id. at 781.
162 Id. at 781-88.
163 See discussion supra Part II.C.
164 750 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1984).
165 Id. at 261.
166 S. Camden Citizens in Action, 274 F.3d at 783-84.
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Second, the majority further held that the underlying issue in
West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,167 was whether the fed-
eral Medicaid statute, not its implementing regulations, created en-
forceable federal rights for § 1983 enforcement purposes. 168 The
court dismissed the statements that "valid federal regulations as well as
federal statutes may create rights enforceable under section 1983,"169
as broad dicta in light of the specific issue in the case.'
70
Third, the court was forced to deal with the decision in Powell v.
Ridge.171 In Powell, the court had specifically allowed the enforcement
of disparate impact regulations issued pursuant to section 602 of Title
VI under § 1983.172 The plaintiffs in Powell filed a claim against Penn-
sylvania that challenged the state's practices in funding public educa-
tion. 173 The plaintiffs claimed that Pennsylvania's public education
funding scheme had a racially discriminatory effect.174 The Powell
court held that a private cause of action existed under Tide VI itself
for the enforcement of section 602 disparate impact regulations, and
that a plaintiff could also maintain an action under § 1983 to enforce
that right. 75 Because, in the court's view, a statutory-based cause of
action existed under Title VI, the Powell decision merely begged the
question of whether the regulations could support a § 1983 action on
their own merit. The court noted that Powell did not expressly address
the specific issue of whether federal regulations could support en-
forceable § 1983 rights on their own and rejected the idea that federal
regulations could support enforceable § 1983 rights without a clear
legislative intent to create such rights.' 76
The NewJersey federal district court followed what was perceived
to be binding precedent by holding that federal regulations can cre-
ate federal rights under § 1983. However, as evidenced by the Wright
dissenters, the recent split panel decision by the Third Circuit, and
the unclear reasoning by the Wight majority, Wight probably does
167 885 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1989).
168 S. Camden Citizens in Action, 274 F.3d at 784 (quoting W. Va. Univ. Hosps., 885
F.2d at 17).
169 W. Va. Univ. Hosps., 885 F.2d at 18.
170 S. Camden Citizens in Action, 274 F.3d at 784.
171 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999).
172 Id. at 397-400.
173 Id. at 391.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 399-400, 403.
176 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 784-85
(3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 70 U.S.L.W. 3669 (U.S. June 24, 2002) (No. 01-1547).
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not stand for this proposition. 77 In Wright, the federal regulation in
question defined the term "rent," but the statutory prohibition on
charging excessive rent was the source of the federal right. 78 The
same cannot be said of the EPA's section 602 disparate impact regula-
tions. The statutory right under Title VI has been interpreted to only
include a prohibition of intentional discrimination. 179 These regula-
tions do not define intentional discrimination but rather ignore any
requirement of intent and simply disregard the subjective mindset of
state and local decision makers.1 80 These regulations may not be con-
sistent with the source of a statutory right under Title VI and probably
do not give rise to enforceable § 1983 rights.' 8 ' The question of the
validity of section 602 disparate impact regulations as a means to "ef-
fectuate"182 the intentional prohibition of discrimination found in
section 601 is unresolved, 183 but it will likely prove extremely impor-
tant for the purposes of enforcement of the disparate impact
regulations.
18 4
The Third Circuit initial panel correctly reversed the lower
court's decision and, despite a strong dissent in the split three judge
panel, the full court rejected a petition for rehearing en banc.18 5 The
district court's reasoning, as well as the Third Circuit opinion, ignores
the fact that Tite VI was enacted under Congress's Spending Clause
power-a vital issue that precludes the use of § 1983 actions against
states without their consent, even if the Supreme Court were to recog-
nize the use of § 1983 to enforce federal rights arising from Title VI's
disparate impact regulations.
177 See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 419 (1987);
id. at 438 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); S. Camden Citizens in Action, 274 F.3d at 788.
178 See Wright, 479 U.S. at 419; id. at 438 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
179 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279-80 (2001).
180 See Nondiscrimination in Programs Receiving Federal Assistance from the En-
vironmental Protection Agency, 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (2001) (prohibiting actions that
merely have an adverse effect).
181 See S. Camden Citizens in Action, 274 F.3d at 788-89.
182 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994).
183 See Sandova4 532 U.S. at 281.
184 If section 602 disparate impact regulations are held to be valid under Title VI,
then the question of what enforcement mechanisms can be used against states be-
comes a significant issue. While it is clear that Titie VI would permit federal agencies
issuing section 602 disparate impact regulations to initiate fund revocation proce-
dures in accordance with the statute, it is less clear whether plaintiffs could obtain
prospective relief under § 1983. This issue is discussed infra Part IV.B.
185 Duffy, supra note 14, at 15.
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IV. STATE IMMUNrIY FOR § 1983 ACTIONS To ENFORCE Trr= VI
DIsPARATE IMPACT REGULATIONS
Assuming that the Court construes § 1983's "and laws" language
to include regulations and that section 602 disparate impact regula-
tions are valid exercises of federal agency power, the use of § 1983 to
enforce these regulations against a state would still be precluded.
This Part examines why, under § 1983 actions to enforce section 602
disparate impact regulations, states cannot be sued for damages, why
state officials should not be subject to suit in their official capacity for
prospective relief, and why state officials may not be subject to § 1983
liability when sued in their individual or personal capacities.
First, a state cannot be sued for damages under a § 1983 action
attempting to enforce section 602 disparate impact regulations. Con-
gress passed Title VI pursuant to its Article I spending power, 86 and
although Title VI includes a specific condition requiring a state to
waive its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity,18 7 § 1983 does
not itself contain such a provision. Because Congress cannot abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity under its Article I powers188 and be-
cause a waiver of sovereign immunity can only be effective in Spend-
ing Clause legislation when a state voluntarily assents to a clear and
unambiguous term or provision waiving immunity, states receiving
federal funds have only waived this immunity for actions consistent
with the terms of the Spending Clause legislation itself-and not for
outside statutory schemes like § 1983.189 Thus, a state would not lose
its Eleventh Amendment protection with regard to suits for damage
filed under § 1983 that allege violations of section 602 disparate im-
pact regulations.
Second, a state official cannot be sued in her official capacity be-
cause the application of the Ex parte Young fiction allowing state offi-
cials to be sued for prospective relief is questionable in the context of
186 Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 598 (1983) (not-
ing that Title VI is spending power legislation).
187 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a) ("A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh
Amendment... for a violation of... title VI of the Civil Rights Act.... .").
188 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78 (2000) (recognizing the holding
from Seminole Tribe that Congress cannot abrogate sovereign immunity under Article I
powers); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 636 (1999) ("Seminole Tribe makes clear that Congress may not abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers.").
189 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 678 (1999) (requiring an express Waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity by a
state and refusing to apply a doctrine of constructive waiver); South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
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Spending Clause legislation. Recognizing a § 1983 action to enforce
section 602 disparate impact regulations would essentially force states
to comply with conditions external to the clear terms found in the
Spending Clause legislation.1 90 This Part examines the new develop-
ments in federal case law recognizing that the Ex parte Young fiction
cannot apply in Spending Clause cases because Spending Clause legis-
lation only binds the state as the supreme law of the land when a state
voluntarily consents to the terms of the spending legislation in a con-
tractual-like manner. 91 Thus, Spending Clause legislation, such as Ti-
te VI, is only the supreme law of the land and only becomes binding
on the states because the states consent to clear and unambiguous
terms as a condition of receiving federal funds.
Third, this Part will briefly examine the applicability of § 1983
actions to enforce federal disparate impact regulations issued pursu-
ant to section 602 with regard to suits against individual state officials
sued in their personal or individual capacities. Individual officials are
typically afforded a qualified immunity defense in such actions and
are not generally required to predict the future development of the
law.' 92 If the federal right is not "clearly established," then a reasona-
ble official is likely to escape with immunity from suit. 193 The only
"clearly established" rights that states agreed to as a condition of re-
ceiving federal funds under Title VI include rights for federal agen-
cies to invoke funding repeal procedures for violations of disparate
impact regulations. Title VI disparate impact regulations could only
190 See, e.g., Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 588 (E.D. Mich.
2001), rev'd, 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2002).
[B]y its terms, § 1983 appears not to protect rights under Spending Power
programs that are "secured" by state, rather than federal law. Finally, events
outside the statute, such as a State's past voluntary submission to suit, legisla-
tive history, or congressional inaction, cannot be used to manufacture a
"clear statement" within a Spending Power program statute to create an obli-
gation upon a State not expressly contained in the statutory language. Sim-
ply put, § 1983 does not operate as a "clear statement" imposing the
obligation upon a State that it submit to private enforcement actions for
violations of federal-state contract terms.
Id It is recognized that this district court decision in not without opposition, but its
logic must not be discounted. See Markva v. Haveman, 168 F. Supp. 2d 695, 704 (E.D.
Mich. 2001) (describing the opinion as "ponderous," yet permitting the parties to
stipulate that the defendant could later raise the same arguments as the defendant in
Westside Mothers if it is upheld on appeal). The Sixth Circuit has recently reversed. See
Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2002).
191 Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 561-62.
192 See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998).
193 Id. at 589.
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support clearly established rights if states consented to their private
enforcement under Tite VI, something that states have not done.
Additionally, the burden and infringement on state sovereignty
of recognizing § 1983 rights for disparate impact regulations without
state consent is quite remarkable in the context of suing state officials.
Federal regulations prohibiting any conduct, decision, or policy that
would have a discriminatory effect would almost always be unclear.
194
We should not expect state officials to predict whether there might be
some unintentional discriminatory effect for every decision they
make. Allowing federal agencies to create, destroy, and modify feder-
ally enforceable rights at will based upon what the agencies determine
to constitute "discriminatory effect" would essentially handcuff local
decisionmaking in fear that a decision might disparately affect some
small group and thus trigger federal liability under § 1983.
A. State Sovereign Immunity for Damages
The Eleventh Amendment generally provides states with immu-
nity from suit 95 unless a state clearly waives this protection I96 or un-
less Congress specifically abrogates the protection through the
194 The EPA has issued various complicated studies and reports to aid officials in
conforming with environmental justice disparate impact regulations. See generally U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assistance, EPA
Homepage, at http://ww.es.epa.gov/oeca/main/ej/index.html (last visited Apr. 20,
2002) (periodically providing published reports and other forms of guidance for com-
pliance). These reports and studies help illustrate the depth of infringement by the
federal government that such unclear, unpredictable, and constantly changing regu-
lations would have on a state executive official's ability to act within an area of tradi-
tional expertise. The level of detail, and whether these regulations actually require a
state to conduct its environmental programs in a specific manner, would bear on the
outcome of whether the regulations implicate the Tenth Amendment and overstep
federalism limits. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997) (holding that
there is no constitutional provision that permits the federal government to force the
states or their officers to become "instruments of federal governance"); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (holding that the Constitution gives Congress
the power to regulate the nation directly, but has "never been understood to confer
upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress'
instructions").
195 See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78 (2000) (noting that Congress
lacks power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Article I); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) ("Even when the Constitution vests in Congress com-
plete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents
congressional authorization of suits by private parties against non-consenting
States."); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890).
196 Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 200 (1996) (requiring an "unambiguous" waiver of
state sovereign immunity).
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exercise of its power to enforce the reconstruction amendments, the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. 197 Congress,
however, cannot abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity in
conjunction with the exercise of its Article I powers. 198 Because Title
VI is derived from Congress's spending power, the relevant inquiry
becomes whether states have clearly waived their Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity from suits seeking damages by accepting federal
funds. This question has been answered in the affirmative. A state
accepting federal funds under Title VI consents and clearly waives its
sovereign immunity to suit by accepting federal financial assistance
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7.199
Although Title VI's waiver of immunity condition applies to states
with regard to suits brought under "title VI... or the provisions of any
other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal fi-
nancial assistance,"200 § 1983 would not be within the scope of this
waiver, and the Supreme Court has held that § 1983 itself does not
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. 20 1 Section 1983 is
not a statute enacted by Congress to prohibit discrimination by recipi-
ents of federal funds. In fact, it does not create any statutory rights; it
merely provides a vehicle to enforce violations of constitutional and
some federal statutory rights. 20 2 To stretch the language of Title VI
found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 to include § 1983 as part of the waiver
197 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (recognizing prior holdings that determined
Congress possessed authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant
to its enforcement powers of the Fourteenth Amendment); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that Congress could use its powers under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
198 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73 (holding that Congress could not use its
Article I powers to circumvent the jurisdictional restrictions of the Eleventh Amend-
ment to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
199 See Lane, 518 U.S. at 198 (noting that Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 to
respond to case law that required a clear and unambiguous waiver of sovereign immu-
nity by the states).
200 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a) (1) (1994) (emphasis added).
201 See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989). "[I]n enacting
§ 1983, Congress did not intend to override well-established immunities or defenses
under the common law." Id. at 67. The Court recognized that Congress could not
sue a state without its consent at the time § 1983 was enacted and that state immunity
from suit continued to exist absent a clear statutory abrogation. Id.
202 Although § 1983 provides a cause of action for the "deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws," it does not create
rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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would violate the requirement that a state's waiver of immunity be
clear and unambiguous.
203
Plaintiffs, such as the South Camden Citizens in Action, cannot
sue states for damages under § 1983 for violations of section 602 dis-
parate impact regulations. First, a state is not a proper "person"
under § 1983 and is therefore immune from damages under § 1983
itself.20 4 Second, under Title VI, there is no waiver of immunity
through an implied private right of action for section 602 regula-
tions.20 5 States consenting to this statute by accepting federal funds
do not agree to a clear and unambiguous condition that they can be
sued for violations of the section 602 disparate impact regulations.
Quite the contrary, states only clearly consent to allowing a federal
agency issuing section 602 regulations to initiate procedures to revoke
funds. These revocation procedures can only proceed after the ap-
propriate federal agency notifies the state of its failure to comply and
concludes that voluntary compliance is not possible.20 6 Although Ti-
tie VI permits federal agencies to "effectuate" regulations, 20 7 the
Court has held that those regulations do not provide a private cause of
action.208 Thus, a state does not waive its sovereign immunity for pri-
vate enforcement of section 602 regulations under Title VI.
The disparate impact regulations could be valid under Title VI,
20 9
but, if so, they would only be enforceable to the extent that Title VI
permits. If the validity of the section 602 disparate impact regulations
is presumed, then the scope of enforcement under Title VI becomes
paramount. Title VI permits enforcement through the issuing federal
agencies by use of its fund revocation procedures, 210 but its condition
for accepting federal funds that requires a waiver of sovereign immu-
nity is not implicated for violations of section 602 disparate impact
regulations because disparate impact regulations do not fall within the
203 See Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 678 (1999) (requiring an express waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity by a
state and refusing to apply a doctrine of constructive waiver).
204 See Wl4 491 U.S. at 64.
205 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
206 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
207 See id.
208 Sandova, 532 U.S. at 293.
209 The validity of section 602 disparate impact regulations as a matter of adminis-
trative law has been questioned. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 463
U.S. 582, 612-14 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court has assumed validity
of the regulations but has never decided the issue. See, e.g., Sandova 532 U.S. at 281.
210 Title VI specifically outlines a procedure that must be followed prior to revok-
ing state funding. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
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scope of Tide VI's Eleventh Amendment immunity waiver. 211 The
Sandoval Court has held that section 602 disparate impact regulations
are not enforceable through a private cause of action under Title VI
itself.21 2 Had the Court recognized an implied private right of action
under section 602, the waiver of immunity under Tide VI would likely
have applied.213 Because there is no consent to private actions or
waiver of immunity for § 1983 claims brought to enforce section 602
disparate impact regulations, a state cannot be sued for damages. The
relief sought and granted by the New Jersey federal district court was
prospective injunctive relief halting the issuance of the air permits.
2 14
It is therefore appropriate to determine if § 1983 could be used to
enforce section 602 disparate impact regulations against state officials
to obtain prospective relief under the theory first advanced in Ex parte
Young.2 15
B. Prospective Relief Under § 1983 and Why Ex Parte Young Does
Not Apply
As discussed above, 216 § 1983 plaintiffs seeking to enforce dispa-
rate impact regulations issued pursuant to section 602 of Tide VI can-
not sue states for damages. The South Camden Citizens, however,
were merely seeking injunctive relief and relied upon the Ex parte
Young legal fiction 2 17 in arguing that the NJDEP state official sued is a
proper "person" under § 1983.218 The Supreme Court adopted the
legal fiction announced in Ex parte Young in order to provide for the
prevention and vindication of constitutional violations committed by
211 The statute provides,
A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment... from suit
in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the Age Discrimination
Act of 1975, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the provisions of any other
Federal Statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial
assistance.
42 U.S.C. §2000d-7(a) (1) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
212 Sandova4 532 U.S. at 293.
213 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a) (1).
214 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 505,
509 (D.N.J. 2001), rev'd, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 70 U.S.L.W. 3669
(U.S.June 24, 2002) (No. 01-1547).
215 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
216 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
217 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 123.
218 S. Camden Citizens in Action, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
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states.219 The legal fiction arises from the notion that when a state
official acts in an official capacity and that action would violate the
Constitution, that official is no longer clothed in the immunity of the
state.220 The state official is no longer acting on the state's behalf
because the act would violate the Constitution-something no state
has authority to do.22 ' While the Ex parte Young legal fiction has been
applied in § 1983 cases to allow plaintiffs to sue a state official in an
official capacity to obtain prospective relief,222 application of the fic-
tion in cases involving Spending Clause legislation is suspect.
223
Recently, a federal district court recognized that the Ex parte
Young legal fiction does not apply in the context of private actions
filed to enforce spending clause conditions against state officials act-
ing in their official capacity.224 In Westside Mothers v. Haveman,225 the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan recognized
longstanding Supreme Court precedent identifying Spending Clause
legislation as inherently contractual in nature and that such legisla-
tion only becomes the supreme law of the land after voluntary consent
by the states.226 In Westside Mothers, the plaintiffs filed a § 1983 action
against a Michigan state official alleging that the State of Michigan
failed to provide certain periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment
services as required by the Social Security Act-a Spending Clause
program.227 The court held that the plaintiffs could not recover be-
cause Michigan had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity
and that the Ex parte Young doctrine did not apply to the Spending
Clause legislation.228 Behind the Westside Mothers decision was the
idea that enforcement of Spending Clause legislation by private indi-
219 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60; see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102-03 (1984).
220 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
221 Id.
222 See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997); Exparte Young, 209
U.S. at 159-60.
223 See Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 562 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
(holding that the Ex parte Young fiction did not apply in the context of Spending
Clause legislation), rev'd, 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2002).
224 Id. at 561.
225 133 F. Supp. 2d 549.
226 Id. at 557, 562. In other words, because state consent is a limit on the valid
exercise of congressional power under the Spending Clause, its absence would render
the legislation unenforceable and less than the supreme law of the land. See South Da-
kota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
227 Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
228 Id. at 587-88.
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viduals could only be legitimate if a state agreed to a private enforce-
ment condition. 22
9
After holding that the Ex parte Young fiction did not permit en-
forcement of the Spending Clause legislation at issue, the court went
further to determine whether § 1983 itself provides a blanket cause of
action for Spending Clause measures. 230 Because a state could not be
sued at the time § 1983 was enacted and Congress did not clearly ex-
press an intent to alter the federal balance, 231 and because states were
immune from suits based on agency and third party beneficiary claims
at the time § 1983 was enacted, 232 the court concluded that § 1983 did
not create a blanket cause of action for the Spending Clause legisla-
tion.23  This reasoning applies to Tide VI and states maintain their
Eleventh Amendment immunity with regard to § 1983 actions to en-
force section 602 disparate impact regulations.
Title VI is an exercise of Congress's spending power, so it is nec-
essarily contractual in nature. 234 It is essentially akin to a contractual
229 Id. at 588.
Strong democratic, federalism and federalism policy concerns undergird
these strictures. Congress is presumed to say what it means in the language
of a statute. When courts are forced to guess at legislative intent, it increases
the risk of laws being created that the people as ultimate sovereign had no
intention of enacting. The risk doubles where two sovereigns are con-
cerned. Here, it is not only the people of the United States as represented
in the Federal Government, but the people of each individual State as repre-
sented by their legislatures and executive branches, whose consent is
required.
Id. (discussing why § 1983 does not provide a private cause of action for the Federal
Medicaid program (footnote omitted)); see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (holding that
Congress's spending power under Article I is limited by several conditions, one being
that Congress must provide "unambiguous" conditions so that a state can know the
consequences of choosing to receive federal funds).
230 Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 575-76. The court in Westside Mothers pro-
vides a very detailed, thorough, and logical explanation for its holding. This Note
only touches upon its reasoning for the purposes of discussing the issue of using
§ 1983 as a legal strategy to enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations.
231 Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989).
232 See Westside Mothers, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 577-82.
233 Id. at 575-76.
234 See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 349 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1980). The Pennhurst
Court stated,
[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature
of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with
federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate
under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and
knowingly accepts the terms of the "contract." There can, of course be no
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relationship between the state and the federal government. The fed-
eral government can revoke funds in accordance with the remedy for
federal agencies found in Title V1235 because states consent to Title
VI's enforcement terms found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 by accepting
federal funds. Undoubtedly, Congress could condition a private right
of action to enforce disparate impact regulations under its spending
power, but only if a state clearly agreed to such an action. 236
The Court in Sandoval has determined, however, that Congress
did not intend a private cause of action for individuals for violations of
section 602 regulations.23 7 If no private action exists for enforcement
of Title VI regulations in Title VI itself, states accepting federal finan-
cial assistance have not consented to any actions outside of the "con-
tract" found in Title VI, and any other private federal statutory cause
of action must rely on the exercise of congressional power other than
the spending power.
Despite the Court's recognition that Congress did not abrogate
state immunity in passing § 1983238 and the obvious relationship be-
tween a state and its officials acting in an official capacity, the Court
has adopted the Ex parte Young fiction and constructed a way for
§ 1983 plaintiffs to sue state officials acting in their official capacity for
prospective relief.239 Ex parte Young adopted a unique legal fiction in
that it allows an exception to a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity
when plaintiffs sue a state official acting in his official capacity, but on
the other hand, that same state official's conduct that is "stripped" of
knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to
ascertain what is expected of it.
Id (citations omitted).
235 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994).
236 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
237 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
238 Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989).
239 SeeExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
The act [of the state official] to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitu-
tional, and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce an uncon-
stitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the
authority of and one which does not affect the State in its sovereign or gov-
ernmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state offi-
cia .... If the act which the state... seeks to enforce be a violation of the
Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment
comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he
is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is sub-
jected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct.
Id. This legal fiction has generally been adopted to allow § 1983 plaintiffs to sue state
officials in their official capacity to gain prospective relief-while suits for damages
against a state are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See id.
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any state "character" is still traditionally considered State action under
the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore the conduct that is
"stripped" in the Ex parte Young sense can still trigger a violation of
constitutional rights by a state.240 Additionally, it is important to note
that although Ex parte Young itself dealt with a constitutional violation,
its reasoning also applies to violations of some federal statutes.
24'
The most important characteristic of understanding why the legal
fiction adopted by the Court in Ex parte Young does not apply in
§ 1983 actions brought to enforce Spending Clause measures, is that
the fiction was adopted to "give life" to the Supremacy Clause. 242 The
idea is that remedies are required to vindicate the federal interest in
the supremacy of the federal law.243 State officials are stripped of
their state authority when acting in violation of supreme federal law.
In other words, "the [Ex parte Young] doctrine is available only where
plaintiffs can demonstrate not only that a state official is violating fed-
eral law, but that the law in question is the supreme law of the
land."24
4
Because Title VI is a Spending Clause enactment, the law only
becomes supreme federal law after a state voluntarily consents to the
conditions of receiving the federal funds.245 The law is, however, only
supreme and binding on states with regard to conditions that were
clearly established and voluntarily assented to when the state decided
to accept federal funds. States consent to the terms of Title VI by
accepting federal funds. In this context, the assumed issue of the va-
240 SeeJOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL., CIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTI-
TUTION 11 (2000).
241 See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997) ("[A]n allega-
tion of an on-going violation of federal law where the requested relief is prospective is
ordinarily sufficient to invoke the Young fiction.").
242 Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 560 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
(quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)), rev'd, 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir.
2002).
243 See id. at 560-61.
244 Id. at 560.
245 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 731 (1999) ("[T]he Supremacy Clause en-
shrines as 'the supreme Law of the land' only those Federal Acts that accord with the
constitutional design. Appeal to the Supremacy Clause alone merely raises the ques-
tion whether a law is a valid exercise of the national power." (citations omitted));
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924-25 (1997) (holding that relying on the
Supremacy Clause returns to the question of whether Congress had the authority to
act).
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lidity of section 602 disparate impact regulations246 becomes
significant.
If the disparate impact regulations are held to be invalid as mat-
ter of administrative law, then the inquiry under Ex parte Young be-
comes moot because there would be no violation of Title VI.
Assuming that the disparate impact regulations are valid, however-as
this Note and the courts have done247 -raises an interesting problem.
If the disparate impact regulations are a valid exercise of executive
authority derived from Title VI, then § 1983 plaintiffs seeking pro-
spective relief against a state official under the Ex parte Young fiction
can argue that the states do consent to the validity of the substance of
the regulations by accepting federal funds. The ultimate issue to be
resolved if section 602 disparate impact regulations are valid as a
means to "effectuate" the provisions of section 601 under the statute,
is whether the state's consent to the substance of those regulations
can be divorced from the state's consent to the manner of enforce-
ment of such regulations. In other words, can the consent of a state
be severable with regard to different sections of Title VI? In theory, if
the consent can be divorced, then the substantive aspect of the dispa-
rate impact regulations could be the supreme law, and thus the Ex
parte Young doctrine could supply a vehicle for prospective relief. The
idea is that states consent to the substantive determination made by
the federal agencies. This view is problematic, and it must be ex-
amined in light of what triggers the supremacy of Spending Clause
legislation. It is the state's consent to clear and unambiguous conditions
that matters.
Spending Clause legislation can only become supreme federal law
and trigger the justified application of the Ex parte Young doctrine
when a state voluntarily agrees to clear and unambiguous condi-
tions.248 In the case under Title VI, states definitely consent to the
entire statutory scheme of Title VI including remedial procedures, 24
9
246 The validity of section 602 disparate impact regulations has been questioned.
See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 612-14 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
247 Id.
248 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). By requiring clear and unam-
biguous terms to provide sufficient notice to what the states agree to, the Court has
limited the Spending Clause power, and thus state consent is required.
249 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 304 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens notes that "[s] ection 601 does not stand in isolation, but rather as part
of an integrated remedial scheme." Id. Although advancing a different point about
the relationship between section 601 and section 602, the idea that Title VI is a non-
severable remedial scheme can be inferred to support that a State consents to the
"integrated remedial scheme." See id.
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and thus are bound by the clear conditions imposed by Title VI. As
previously discussed, 250 when a state accepts federal funds under Title
VI, it clearly waives its immunity to suits arising under Title VI, and it
also agrees to be bound by a specific revocation procedure that can be
initiated by federal agencies. 251 The Court has foreclosed private en-
forcement of section 602 disparate impact regulations under Title VI
itself.2 52 The only remaining enforcement mechanism that states have
clearly consented to is the funds revocation procedure vested in fed-
eral agencies.
A state's consent to the substance and enforcement of Spending
Clause legislation conditions should not be severed because the state's
consent to the entire scheme is what gives the Spending Clause su-
preme effect as a valid exercise of constitutional power under Article
J.253 Because the Ex parte Young fiction is applied to "give life to the
Supremacy Clause," a court should not apply the legal fiction in a
manner that would dissect a state's consent to a statutory scheme into
sub-parts that are convenient to achieve a desired judicial outcome.
The law should only become supreme and trigger application of the
Ex parte Young fiction when the state consents to all the clear terms of
the entire Spending Clause legislation. Absent specific language indi-
cating that its consent to substantive law is separate and distinct from
its consent to enforcement of that substantive law, a state could hardly
foresee such judicial application of the legal fiction as a clear condi-
tion of accepting federal funds. The use of the Ex parte Young doc-
trine in such a way would likely run afoul of the original basis for its
adoption and of the constitutional limits of the Spending Clause
power because Congress has not provided the states with clear notice
as to what conditions will become authoritative.
254
Additionally, the Ex parte Young fiction and its "stripping" notion
may be much more appropriate when applying it as originally in-
tended-to vindicate the Constitution.255 When the federal govern-
ment issues a prohibition or regulates according to a legitimate
enumerated power-other than the spending power-the federal
250 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
251 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1; see also Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 200 (1996).
252 Sandova, 532 U.S. at 293.
253 See id. at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
254 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
255 SeeExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) ("If the act which the state...
seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding
under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitu-
tion, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character .
(emphasis added)).
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law's supremacy is independent of state consent.2 56 The Ex parte
Young doctrine best accomplishes its important goal of vindicating
federal interests by "giving life" to the Supremacy Clause when the
federal government acts pursuant to a power other than the spending
power.2 57 The use of this fiction to avoid the Eleventh Amendment by
"stripping" the authority of a state official to allow for prospective in-
junctive relief to prevent future violations of the Constitution or fed-
eral law is more persuasive than using the fiction to circumvent
obtaining state consent in the spending power context. This is be-
cause the state voluntarily agrees to be bound by the spending legisla-
tion-especially in light of the fact that Congress has the power to
determine the conditions of the Spending Clause legislation.
Vindication of the federal right or interest is less important in
Spending Clause legislation. Because Congress possesses the power to
control the terms, it can ensure vindication of federal interests by
clearly identifying and establishing the conditions to which the states
must agree. Therefore, in Spending Clause statutes, the need to re-
sort to a judicially created legal fiction to protect federal interests is
alleviated. These additional reasons support avoiding the temptation
to divorce a state's consent to the substance of assumed valid section
602 disparate impact regulations from a state's consent to enforce-
ment of those regulations. The severability of state consent with re-
gard to different sections of Spending Clause legislation is an
intriguing issue that could arise if the Court were to uphold the valid-
ity of section 602 disparate impact regulations. 258
256 SeeWestside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 587 (E.D. Mich. 2001),
rev'd, 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2002).
257 See id. at 560 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)) ("ET]he
availability of prospective relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the
Supremacy Clause. Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law
are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law." (empha-
sis added)).
258 If indeed the Court upheld the validity of section 602 regulations and applied
the Ex parte Young doctrine to allow individuals to use § 1983 to obtain prospective
relief by suing state officials in their official capacity, an issue regarding the Tenth
Amendment and limits of federalism may be implicated. Because a state does not
consent to the private enforcement of disparate impact regulations, the federal agen-
cies would essentially be adopting regulations that govern how a state makes its envi-
ronmental decisions. The regulations could potentially require state officials, subject
to the threat of federal enforcement by private action under § 1983, to become "in-
struments of federal governance." Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997)
(holding that there are no constitutional provisions that permit the federal govern-
ment to force the states or their officers to become "instruments of federal policy").
On the other hand, if the regulations adopted and implemented by the federal agen-
cies under section 602 merely regulate state activity as opposed to the manner of the
1641
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By foreclosing private action claims for violations of disparate im-
pact regulations under Title VT, 259 the Court has essentially deter-
mined that section 602 disparate impact regulations are only
enforceable through the express remedy available to the federal agen-
cies under the issuing of those regulations to initiate fund revocation
procedures. Because a state likely consents to the entire Title VI statu-
tory scheme, the only conditions for enforcement of section 602 dis-
parate impact regulations that states assent to upon acceptance of
federal funds are those designed to allow the federal agencies to re-
voke funds in order to achieve compliance.
Another counterargument in favor of using § 1983, is that Title
VI provides that compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant
to section 602 may be achieved by the express funds revocation proce-
dure or "by any other means authorized by law. ' 260 This provision has
effect, but only when other methods of compliance are authorized by
law. When a state consents to the conditions of Title VI, which pro-
hibit intentional discrimination, 261 there is little doubt that a section
602 regulation prohibiting intentional discrimination could be en-
forced by a private action under Title VI and this would essentially
ensure compliance by "other means... authorized by law." "Law" in
this portion of the statute also refers to supreme law, and only that
which a state consents to under Spending Clause legislation becomes
supreme-states do not consent to private enforcement of disparate
impact regulations under Title VI, so this would not be a form of com-
pliance "authorized by law."
C. State Officials Sued as Individuals and Qualified Immunity
Because there is no waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity,
and because the Ex parte Young fiction should not apply for plaintiffs
using § 1983 to enforce Spending Clause legislation, the plaintiffs' last
resort is to use the option of suing the state official in his individual or
personal capacity. Suits against state officials are recognized under
§ 1983 because state officials satisfy the "person" requirement and be-
cause their position leads to the possibility that their actions are
activity, the Printz issue could be avoided. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150-51
(2000) (holding that the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2721-2725 (1994 & Supp. IV 2000), did not violate the federalism principles estab-
lished in Printz, 521 U.S. at 919, and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162
(1992)).
259 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
260 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994).
261 Sandoval 532 U.S. at 279-81.
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"under color of [law] ."262 Additionally, an executive officer is usually
entitled to a privilege of qualified immunity-that is, liability may not
attach unless the official violates a clearly established constitutional or
statutory right.
263
State officials, such as the head of the NJDEP, should not be sub-
ject to liability under § 1983 for violations of Title VI disparate impact
for two reasons. First, the federal right under Tite VI disparate im-
pact regulations could not be derived without consent to such private
enforcement by the state under Title VI. Title VI is only binding on
states and state officials to the extent that the statute applies, and Title
VI does not provide a private cause of action for disparate impact reg-
ulations issued under section 602 of Title VI.
2 64
Second, officials would likely be protected by qualified immu-
nity.265 Because the federal disparate impact regulations are so vague
and indeterminate, state officials would probably not realize their vio-
lation 266-in fact their violation would almost inevitably turn on
whether the action taken has some unforeseeable result or upon a
federal agency's interpretation. Although some trends could eventu-
ally establish some "dearly established rights,"' 267 the policy concerns
of handicapping our state and local officials with numerous volumes
of federal regulations requiring compliance are strong. Interference
with local officials absent constitutional and statutory authority is dan-
gerous indeed. One can imagine the constant training sessions that
would be required for all executive officers throughout all of the
states on the proper way to avoid a disparate impact in making deci-
262 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 614-15 (1999)
(requiring a violation of a clearly established right for liability to attach to an execu-
tive official and holding that defendants had not violated a clearly established right
under the Fourth Amendment when they brought media personnel along during an
execution of a search warrant); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 186 (1961) (taking a broad approach to the interpreta-
tion of "under color of [law]").
263 Crawford-E, 523 U.S. at 588-89.
264 Sandova, 532 U.S. at 293.
265 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615 (noting that "clearly established" for purposes of
qualified immunity means that in light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness of the
official's act must be apparent to a reasonable official).
266 The disparate impact regulations prohibit conduct that merely has a discrimi-
natory adverse impact. See Nondiscrimination in Programs Receiving Federal Assis-
tance from the Environmental Protection Agency, 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (2001).
267 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609 (stating that in addressing the qualified immunity
issue, the Court would first establish whether a constitutional right exists and then
determine if that right was clearly established at the time of the conduct in question
and stating that proceeding in this manner might provide notice of the previously
unclear rights to executive officials).
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sions-all of this while federal agencies conjure up new regulations
and publicly advance how progressive and helpful their efforts are to
the environment of the whole nation. States must voluntarily accept
this federal mandate of policy distributed through regulations-or
Congress must use another power to achieve its goals.
CONCLUSION
Using § 1983 to enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations in
the name of environmental justice has not prevailed in the past, nor
should it prevail in the future. Although protecting individuals
against racial and ethnic discrimination in the environmental deci-
sionmaking process is a just cause, the judiciary would exceed its
proper role in allowing § 1983 to be used to enforce Title VI disparate
impact regulations. First, the Court has relied on an unclear legisla-
tive history to expand § 1983 to cover violations of federal statutes,
and any further expansion beyond the plain meaning of "and laws" to
include federal regulations would stretch the plain meaning-one
that the Court admits is uncertain-and substitute its will for that of
the legislature. Neither the plain meaning, nor the legislative history
supports this further expansion-even when plaintiffs seek vindica-
tion of a worthy cause. Second, even if the Court did expand § 1983
to allow for vindication of federal regulatory rights, there remain
doubts about whether Title VI's section 602 disparate impact regula-
tions would be a valid exercise of executive authority under the
statute.
Despite these threshold obstacles, using § 1983 to enforce Title
VI disparate impact regulations is also foreclosed because states have
not voluntarily agreed to private enforcement of these disparate im-
pact regulations as part of Title VI's "strings" for receiving federal
funds. Allowing plaintiffs access to the federal courts to enforce con-
ditions on the states that never became the supreme law of the land
pursuant to the required consent under the spending power would
ignore the underlying reasons for adopting the Ex parte Young legal
fiction and would exceed the limits of Congress's Article I spending
power. Allowing federal agencies to establish ever-changing, unclear
federal rights would expose state officials to tremendous potential lia-
bility and indirectly curtail state autonomy in areas where the federal
government has not exercised an enumerated and constitutionallyjus-
tified power. Allowing the environmental justice plaintiffs from South
Camden, New Jersey, to succeed on their § 1983 legal theory would
circumvent the holding in Alexander v. Sandoval, would circumvent the
legislative will, and would unconstitutionally force federal compulsion
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of state and local officials to follow regulations not validly issued
under an enumerated power. Congress could amend Title VI to
achieve this result, and at least then, states could voluntarily choose to
submit to federal policymaking on local issues when deciding to ac-
cept federal funds. Although the current reality of state financial de-
pendence on the federal government could ultimately make state
consent to private enforcement of disparate impact regulations inevi-
table, obtaining such consent for individual private enforcement of
section 601 disparate impact regulations would comport with the con-
stitutionally defined and limited powers of Congress.
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